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MOLECULAR FEDERALISM AND THE STRUCTURES OF
PRIVATE LAWMAKING
Abstract: This symposium contribution explores “molecular federalism,”
an idea floated briefly in the author’s earlier work on private lawmaking.
The many private lawmakers—ranging from familiar organizations like
the American Law Institute and the New York Stock Exchange to less
well known ones, like the International Chamber of Commerce and
associations of banks—are here envisioned as part of a federalist scheme
that operates at a “molecular” level rather than at the level of the state.
Assuming that many private entities have de facto lawmaking power, as
suggested in the earlier paper, their function and legitimacy, and the
strengths and weaknesses of private lawmaking, are assessed under the
rubric of federalism.
The paper takes up both horizontal and vertical aspects of molecular
federalism, considering the possibilities of competitive private
lawmaking and the potential for (and limits of) governmental control.
The article accounts for the extraterritoriality of private lawmaking and
considers how private legislation may escape some of the vertical checks
and balances associated with state-based federalism, not only through
extraterritoriality, but also through some surprising shifts in the federalist
hierarchy. The paper also explores the question of how one legal regime
can become dominant, while other contexts may suffer legal
fragmentation. The paper attempts to place its analysis within the context
of some prominent U.S. theorists of federalism, including Herbert
Wechsler and Justice Brennan, and contemporary European theorists,
such as Gunther Teubner. The conclusion is that molecular federalism,
like its state-based counterpart, produces mixed results, and often in a
way that accentuates both the strengths and the weaknesses of statebased federalism. The paper also suggests that a constitution for private
lawmaking, or a similar system of meta-rules, may be necessary to allow
private lawmaking to come closest to its potential.
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MOLECULAR FEDERALISM AND THE STRUCTURES OF
PRIVATE LAWMAKING
David V. Snyder*
In a far flung, free society, the federalist values are enduring.
They call upon a people to achieve a unity sufficient to resist
their common perils and advance their common welfare,
without undue sacrifice of their diversities and the creative
energies to which diversity gives rise.1

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to assess privately made law (or private
lawmaking) as a kind of federalism, thus taking up a point floated
briefly in an earlier article.2 A very questionable legitimacy is the
main challenge for private lawmaking. Competition, or its
governmental equivalent—federalism—may help legitimate what
otherwise might appear to be an unseemly enterprise by which de
facto laws are made outside the structures of democracy or any

Copyright © David V. Snyder, Professor of Law, Tulane Law School, New
Orleans; Visiting Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University, Washington, D.C. This paper was prepared for presentation at the
Second International Workshop in Comparative Research in Law and Political
Economy, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 9 November 2006, and I would
like to extend my sincere thanks to Prof Dr Peer Zumbansen for the invitation
and to the other workshop participants for their comments. I am also grateful to
workshop participants at American University for their comments and to Janette
M. Hays for research assistance. Further comments and reactions are quite
welcome at dsnyder1@tulane.edu. All remaining errors are my own.
*

Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543
(1954).
1

2

David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 437 (2003).
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other government. Because private lawmaking happens without
established structures and depends on ad hoc combinations of
private actors, I refer to what occurs in the private realm as
molecular federalism. Madison envisioned the United States as a
“compound republic,”3 and conceptualizing private lawmaking as
“molecular federalism” follows his “compound” analogy: The
metaphor of the molecule (as opposed to the atom) invokes the idea
of a compound because private lawmaking can only occur as a
cooperative effort of at least two actors, and usually many more.
This figure thus recognizes that even privately made law is a social
function.
Aside from serving as a template with which to assess the
legitimacy of private lawmaking, federalism can also help uncover
the dynamics of different kinds of private lawmaking. The complex
of governmental and private relationships in a federalist system,
which has received careful analysis for many decades, can show
how different lawmaking entities—public and private—influence
and react to each other. Further, as the scholarly treatments of
federalism have shown, a federalist organization of government is
hardly perfect. Bringing this learning about federalism to bear on
private lawmaking can help reveal some of the strengths and
weaknesses of allowing rule generation to reside in the private
sphere.
Finally, the “compound” idea of the molecule and of federalism
may be consonant with some of the German systems theorists’
emphasis on what they call “communications.”4 In fact, the notion
of molecular federalism may be linked with the idea of “civic
constitutionalism” or “societal constitutionalism” suggested by

3

Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

See generally, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 467 (Klaus A.
Ziegert trans., Oxford U.P. 2004).

4
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David Sciulli and expounded by Gunther Teubner.5 This link is
probably most apparent in Professor Teubner’s reformulation of
Grotius’s dictum ubi societas ibi ius: “Law-making also takes place
outside the classical sources of international law, in agreements
between global players, in private market regulation by
multinational concerns, internal regulations of international
organisations, interoroganisational negotiating systems, worldwide standardisation processes that come about partly in markets,
partly in processes of negotiation among organisations.”6 This
conception describes well at least the international aspects of
private lawmaking and can be applied almost as easily to domestic
private lawmaking too.
This paper does not aim at high theory; instead, it concentrates on
the checks and balances, and the particular costs and benefits,
associated with allocating power across a shifting hierarchy of
public and private lawmakers. Still, this exercise can be seen as an
early cut at some of the issues embedded in the “difficult empirical
and normative question” that Professor Teubner poses: “How
political and autonomous social constitutionalisation” actually
takes place.7 Because of strict space limitations, this paper considers
the federalism of the United States and private lawmaking in the
commercial or business sphere. Even within that scope, the paper is
confined to a brief, essayistic treatment. It also omits some

See DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1992), cited in
Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred
Constitutional Theory (Storrs Lectures, Yale Law School 2003-2004), in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges,
Inge-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004), and in IUS ET LEX 2004, 31-50,
and in LAW AND SOCIETY APPROACHES TO CYBERSPACE (Paul Schiff Berman ed.
2006) [hereinafter Teubner, Storrs Lecture]. I am grateful to Professor Fernanda
Nicola for bringing this Storrs lecture to my attention.
5

6

Teubner, Storrs Lecture, at 13.

7

Id. at 14.

4
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important international issues, including the kind of federalism or
regulatory competition that arguably obtains in Europe,8 as well as
the complex analysis that would be required to put together the
rules of private international law with the idea of molecular
federalism.

II. A CONCEPTION OF PRIVATE LAWMAKING
The idea of private lawmaking, as the phrase is used here, is
explained at length in my previous article.9 To summarize: The
meaning of law is understood in the tradition of Legal Realism and
is adapted from Holmes and Llewellyn: law is simply a prediction
about what an authoritative decisionmaker will do about a
dispute.10 Private lawmaking, roughly, is the process by which

For good entries into the literature, see, e.g., BRUNO S. FREY & REINER
EICHENBERGER, THE NEW DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM FOR EUROPE: FUNCTIONAL,
OVERLAPPING, AND COMPETING JURISDICTIONS (2002), and more recently, Klaus
Heine, Interjurisdictional Competition and the Allocation of Constitutional Rights: A
Research Note, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 33 (2006), and with respect to corporate
law particularly, Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J.
1725 (2006).
8

See generally Snyder, Private Lawmaking. In addition to sources cited there, see
Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445
(Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986).
9

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Address at Boston University School of Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 458 (1896) (“a legal duty is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by
judgment of the court; and so of a legal right”). See also K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 12 (1951 or 1960 republication of
1930 lectures) (emphasis in original):
10

This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is
the business of law. And the people who have the doing in charge,
whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are
officials of the law. What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the
law itself.
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private actors (or more often, groups of private actors) make rules
that de facto bind, or significantly affect, large groups.
The purest form of private lawmaking is a process in which a
private group makes rules that bind others without the others’
specific consent. This form involves the same dynamic as public
lawmaking, in which, say, Congress and the President together can
make laws that will bind all United States citizens without any
specific consent by each citizen to that particular law. An example
of this form of private lawmaking is the binding effect of certain
interbank agreements. For example, under Uniform Commercial
Code § 4-103(b),11 agreements by banks on how checks are cleared
can bind everyone who writes checks, regardless of whether the
checkwriters agree to these rules. So-called self-regulatory
organizations, like the New York Stock Exchange, may also fit this
model, as do similarly important but less well-known organizations
that govern accounting and audit standards (e.g., the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, a private-sector organization whose
arguable failures led to the public creation of another private board,
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).12 The rules
privately made by these organizations are frequently given formal
legal authority by government action,13 so these rules sometimes
blend into the next category.
In a less pure form of private lawmaking, a private group makes
rules that will generally bind others, but a formal public

“Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and
the like have the effect of agreements under subsection (a), whether or not
specifically assented to by all parties interested in items handled.”

11

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 750 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).

12

For example, Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial Reporting
Release No. 1, § 101, adopts the standards of the FASB.

13
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intermediation is required, as where public legislatures adopt
privately drafted codes and model laws, or where public courts
adopt and apply privately drafted restatements and principles. The
American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform States Laws (NCCUSL) exemplify this
kind of private lawmaking, and they are the best known and most
studied of U.S. private legislatures. Another form of private
lawmaking involves a private entity that will make rules that bind
others through thousands or millions of adhesionary contracts.
Credit card agreements are a prime example, but there are
countless others, including warranties given by large sellers like
automobile manufacturers. Rules made by trade associations, such
as the International Chamber of Commerce rules for letters of credit
(UCP), can also fit in this category; the rulebooks promulgated by
such organizations are often incorporated by reference into
thousands or millions of contracts. There are also innumerable
other examples of private lawmaking, ranging from homeowners’
associations to trade associations to standard-setting organizations
and so on.14

III. FEDERALISM AND PRIVATE LAWMAKING
Federalism in the United States operates on two axes. The vertical
axis describes the hierarchical relationship between the national
and the state governments; the horizontal axis describes the
relationship between the states, which are set up independently of
each other. Each of these dimensions carries several characteristics,
such as the possibility of competition between states and the power
of one government to check another. This part of the paper
introduces each of these dimensions and aspects of federalism and
considers how each applies to private lawmaking.

Except as noted above, each of these examples is explained further, with ample
citation, in Snyder, Private Lawmaking, at 378-402.

14
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A. VERTICAL FEDERALISM
1. THE IDEA OF VERTICALITY
Vertical federalism refers to the relation between the states and the
national government. The label makes the hierarchy explicit; the
states are placed below the federal government, and thus state law
is subject to preemption by federal law, including federal
legislation and regulation.15 In this sense, the national government
and all of its many entities with regulatory authority, exercising
supreme power, can check state governmental actions. Less
obviously, the states can also serve as a check on the national
government in some circumstances. From a formalistic and
structural view, the national government is supreme only within
the confines of its purposely limited powers. Under the Tenth
Amendment, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”16 Largely ignored or
repressed during the generations since the New Deal, these ideas of
federalism—i.e., limited federal power—became more important
again under the Rehnquist Court.17
There are at least two

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause). Note the importance of
understanding preemption doctrine as part of federalism. See Samuel Issacharoff
& Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006).

15

U.S. CONST. amdt. X; see also id. amdts. XI (restraining federal judicial power in
cases against states), IX (reserving unenumerated rights to the people).
16

The expansive view of federal power is often linked to the “switch in time that
saved nine” during the New Deal. Earlier efforts of the Supreme Court to hold
back social reform legislation were abruptly reversed, and the thinking
epitomized by the majorities in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its
progeny lost their footing in cases like West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
291 (1937) (overruling Lochner-era cases), and United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (declaring a need for judicial deference to economic
regulations). A recently more invigorated federalism under the Tenth
Amendment can be seen in the cases collected infra note 29, and under other
17

8
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other prominent theories on how states can serve as a democratic
check on the federal government. One is associated with an idea
that the late Justice Brennan propounded in a law review article
published during what Brennan saw as the retrenchment by the
Burger Court on individual rights.
Brennan argued that state courts should recognize state-based
protections of individual rights when no federal right is recognized,
noting that several state courts had done so.18 The Supreme Court
of the United States has no power to reverse these decisions, of
course, since they rest on state rather than federal law.19 Brennan
noted that this state power has been exercised not only in response
to the narrower view of federal rights that prevailed in the times
after the Warren Court, but also in the long era before the federal
Bill of Rights was held to restrain action by the states at all (i.e.,
before the Bill of Rights was incorporated against the states).20
Brennan thus saw the state and federal courts providing “a double
source of protection” for individual rights through this

cases such as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (Gun-Free School
Zones Act not within federal power), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
613 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act not within federal power). See also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (reaffirming broad, extratextual
view of state immunity from suit under Eleventh Amendment); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (same). Still, the idea of limited powers may have reached its
modern apogee under Rehnquist, and there is good reason to question how the
Court will resolve similar questions in the future. For example, Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005), may represent the broadest recognition ever of congressional
power over commerce.
18 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).

See id. at 501 (citing, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)).

19

20

See id. at 501-02.
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longstanding mechanism.21 Even more significantly for purposes of
private lawmaking, Brennan suggested that state courts give
greater meaning to the federal Due Process Clause by recognizing,
as a matter of state common law, property and liberty interests.
Once state law recognizes those rights—including contract and
property rights—they are protected by the federal Due Process
guarantee.22
A second prominent theory of the state-based check on national
power comes from a complex analysis by Herbert Wechsler.
Instead of emphasizing the courts, he concentrated on the political
structure set up by the Constitution. He argued that “the national
political process in the United States—and especially the rôle of the
states in the composition and selection of the central government—
is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new
intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.”23 The idea is
based on the political reality, recognized across the centuries from
James Madison to Tip O’Neill, that even in Congress politics is
more local than national.24 Wechsler also thought that the electoral
college enhances the power of states—particularly large ones
whose electoral votes could sway a presidential election. The
argument requires detailed explanation to be clear, but in

21

See id. at 503.

22

See id.

23 Wechsler, supra note 1, at 558. A dynamic similar to Brennan’s and Wechsler’s
is expounded in two articles by Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987), and Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994).

See Federalist No. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“A
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a
national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States.”); TIP
O’NEILL & GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME
(1993) (O’Neill served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1977
to 1986).
24

10
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summary, it rests on a few structural points: (a) the electors for each
state vote together, (b) the college cannot elect a president without
a majority, and (c) failing a majority, the presidential decision shifts
to the House of Representatives, voting by state—a potent albeit
generally dormant threat.
Although Wechsler devoted the bulk of his influential article to this
complicated political and constitutional analysis, he also made
another point first, perhaps thinking it the strongest: the states are
protected because they exist and exercise their powers. Wechsler
did not attempt to elaborate or justify the point further, but to my
mind (and apparently to his), it has great intuitive plausibility. It
also works well with what seems the essential idea in his article,
which is that the national government often finds interference with
state law to be inexpedient, except for interstitial regulation. For
example, one of the clearest and best known areas of competence
for the national government is the regulation of interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause.25 The courts have given
this Clause an extraordinarily expansive reading,26 and contracts
and commercial transactions easily fall within this core federal
power. Yet Congress still leaves systematic regulation of those
activities to the states, with only piecemeal adjustment through
national legislation.
Even a brisk description, then, shows a vertical relationship that is
characterized by more than a straight, top-down, preemptive
dynamic. Although there is little doubt about the formal supremacy
of the national government, and its practical supremacy when it
chooses to exercise its power, practice shows a relationship in
which the national government can show more restraint than is
required by the constitutional principles enunciated by the

25

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

26

See citing Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Supreme Court. (Recall that the Supreme Court has taken a quite
liberal view to federal power since the switch during the New Deal,
with modest inroads during the tenure of the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist.)27 Although this restraint may have something to do
with principles expressed in the text of the Constitution, and the
culture that the venerated text inculcates, it may well have more to
do with simple (or not so simple) expedience.
2. THE VERTICAL AXIS OF MOLECULAR FEDERALISM
To assess how private lawmaking functions along the vertical axis
of federalism, we first must keep in mind that the vertical axis of
governmental federalism sets up an explicit but complicated
hierarchy, with the national government being “supreme” within
its sphere, but powerless outside its sphere. The national sphere, as
mentioned, includes commerce28 and thus encompasses the
activities discussed here. The importance of this point is that
commercial activities, in terms of government power, may be
regulated by the states or the federal government or both, but if the
federal government wishes to preempt the states, it can.
Private lawmaking, at first blush, would appear to be at the bottom
of the hierarchy, with the state, and ultimately national
government, both placed higher. In other words, private
lawmaking could be displaced either by state or by federal
lawmaking—a reassuring point, seemingly, given concerns about
the legitimacy of private lawmaking. Often both state and federal
law can thus check private lawmaking, and sometimes local law
can too. In the usual run of cases, then, private lawmaking is easier
to displace than governmental lawmaking, and the displacement is

27

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Any doubts about the breadth of national
power to regulate commerce were put to rest in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005).

28
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less constitutionally fraught than in the governmental realm.
Although power struggles between the state and national
government can sometimes raise issues of constitutional moment
and has occasioned one of the most (in)famous short-term reversals
in Supreme Court precedent,29 the displacement of privately made
law rarely implicates such issues, as long as the legislation is
prospective. Not since the Lochner era has the Constitution been
read to protect prospective freedom of contract, assuming the
governmental regulation can pass the extremely deferential rational
basis scrutiny.30 Because of the vertical dimension of federalism,
then, government regulation can easily displace private
lawmaking.
This displacement may happen in different ways, and different
methods of regulation may ameliorate different problems of private
lawmaking. Through substantive regulation and displacement, of
course, public lawmakers can outright override private lawmaking
with mandatory rules, either partially or entirely. Through
procedural regulation, public lawmakers may regulate the process of
private lawmaking by encouraging competition, or prohibiting
moves that will lead to dominance. Enforcement of the antitrust
laws, despite current exemptions for many private lawmaking

See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (which seems to reject Garcia); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also the sources cited supra note 17.

29

On the demise of the Lochner era and the advent of judicial deference to
economic regulation, see supra note 17. The Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”), is interpreted to be limited to state or local laws that interfere with
existing contracts. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).

30
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activities, would be an example.31 Finally, through procedural
displacement, public lawmakers might completely control the
process for rule generation. For instance, this method is sometimes
used in standard setting.32
3. THE SURPRISING, SHIFTING HIERARCHY OF MOLECULAR FEDERALISM
So far so good, then: any concerns about the illegitimate exercise of
private power through private lawmaking is subject to a double
check by the state and national government. Experience shows,
however, that this theory leaves out important dynamics of
commercial law and federalism, and these dynamics can cause
private lawmaking to jump places in the hierarchy, in at least two
ways. First, the shift can happen smoothly, and in an almost
planned way. Much publicly made commercial law consists of
default rules, and they are by their nature subject to displacement
by private agreement, including the kinds of agreements that we
consider private lawmaking. That the bulk of commercial law
consists of defaults rules is now perhaps a commonplace. Some
scholars go further, arguing that some of these default rules
actually encourage private displacement, as is the case with
“penalty default rules.” With such rules, the law sets a contract
term in a way that would penalize one or both parties, thus
encouraging them to reach agreement on the term and displace the
default rule. This strategy would force the disclosure of
information and bargaining over the term, which might be seen as

See Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting
Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1393 (2004).
31

See RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ch. ___, at ___
(2005).

32

14
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beneficial.33 Yet regardless of this strong-form default strategy,
publicly made law is often designed to bow to privately made law.
Second, a more jarring shift in the hierarchy can occur in an entirely
different way. Consider the rules made by banks, and especially by
associations of large banks. On first blush, state and federal
lawmaking can check private lawmaking. A state that attempts to
regulate private lawmaking, however, may itself be displaced by a
federal law that validates private lawmaking despite the attempts
of the would-be regulating state. For example, banks that issue
credit cards—generally as part of bank associations that do
business under the Visa or MasterCard brands—elect to be
chartered as “national banks” and thus become entitled to the
protections of the National Bank Act. One key function of the
National Bank Act and the federal agency charged with its
administration (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) is to
protect national banks from much state regulation. Thus, in issuing
its Visa card, a bank that is legally located in South Dakota or
Delaware (usually through the placement of the subsidiary credit
card entity there) may freely violate usury laws, or even laws
regulating many other terms such as late fees and the like, in other
states.34 The law implemented by the tens of millions of private

The scholarship on default rules is vast, and even that on penalty defaults is
considerable. A good entry into the literature is the recent Symposium, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007). The seminal article is Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
33

Justice Brennan held in Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp. that
a national bank can export its interest rates to other states, so long as the interest
rates are legal in the home state of the bank. 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978) (construing
12 U.S.C. § 85). In response to litigation claiming that Citibank late fees were not
interest and thus not protected by Marquette, the OCC promulgated a regulation
protecting the bank, see 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001, an action which was not only upheld
but which received significant judicial deference, see Smiley v. Citibank (South

34
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contracts entered between such banks and their credit-card
customers is therefore therefore superior to the state law in those
other states. This repositioning of the hierarchy so that private
lawmaking becomes superior to state lawmaking is always possible
in the commercial field because it is within the federal Commerce
Clause power.35 To be sure, the national government must act—
through an instrument such as the National Bank Act—to achieve
this result. But in the commercial realm, such action is always
possible under current interpretations of constitutional principles,
and the effects of even a single act and a single federal regulatory
agency can be far-reaching.
On this understanding, then, most of Brennan’s arguments about
federalism do not hold. He supposed that the national constitution
would establish a floor of immutable individual rights, and that
state constitutions could provide more rights, through their text
and through interpretation by state courts. While this analysis
works for constitutional rights, it dissolves when the rights are not
of constitutional stature. Although in many cases there will indeed
be “a double source of protection,”36 the national government can
elect to withhold its own protection and to prevent the states from
extending any. In the absence of constitutional strictures (and there

Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
One might analogize the shifting hierarchies in this complex federalist scheme
to the shifting legal hierarchies forced by further outgrowth of law and society,
not just into the then-nearly-unimaginable size of the United States, but now into
the global context. See Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: The SelfDeconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy, ___ LAW & SOC’Y REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007)
(deconstruction of the law’s hierarchy occurs through globalization).

35

An important recent example is the enforcement campaign by the former
Attorney General of New York, Eliot Spitzer, to enforce laws against corporate
and securities fraud that could as well have been enforced by the national
authorities (and in particular, by the Securities and Exchange Commission).

36
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are few in the commercial realm),37 private lawmaking is subject to
a critique based on individual rights.
In the context of private lawmaking, one of Brennan’s arguments
actually works in what he may have regarded as a perverse way.
He suggested that state courts, just through the development of
common law (without the need to resort to constitutional law),
could recognize property and liberty interests. Such expanding
recognition would presumably afford greater status to the contract
rights that are the product of private lawmaking. In this way, laws
that are privately made through contract, once those contract rights
are recognized as a kind of property interest, are themselves
protected under the federal Due Process Clause. In this way, it is
true that the apparently lowest rung on the hierarchical ladder—
the contracts of private actors—can act as a check on federal
legislative action, although the Due Process guarantees for
economic rights are relatively minimal. Of course, the normative
valence of this shift in the hierarchy will depend on whether
freedom of contract, as exercised in private lawmaking, is a right
more important than the various rights (e.g., protection from
usury) that can get trampled in the process. That is an ideological
question beyond the scope of the present paper.
Moving to the political (as opposed to rights-based) views
on federalism, Wechsler’s ideas seem to hold in a general but not a
particular sense. He understood the political process, as structured
by the Constitution, to resist new intrusions by the center. The
hierarchy shift, which presumably occurs at political instance,
shows how some players can protect their freedom both from the
states and from the national government by appealing to the
national government. Curiously, both banks and consumers have

37

See supra note 17.
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found this strategy successful,38 a fact that may reflect
happenstance, changing political times, or a structural effect. In this
context, however, Wechsler has not proven correct in the
particulars. He saw the political structure as tilted to protecting
state power against the national government. These instances
suggest that private power has successfully defended itself through
politics from national and state governance.

B. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
1. THE BASICS OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
Horizontal federalism refers to state powers in relation to the other
states. This relationship has several famous facets. States can serve
as laboratories of democracy, attempting different solutions to
problems, without dragging the whole country into the
experiment.39 This advantage is not merely theoretical; several
crucial and successful national efforts originated in this way,
including women’s suffrage, unemployment insurance, and
minimum wage laws.40 A related, more economically oriented idea,
suggests that the states form a marketplace for democracy, where
the states compete for customers (residents and/or taxpayers, and

An example on the consumer side is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312, which
purposefully displaces inconsistent state law allowing sellers to disclaim certain
warranties. For an explanation of the political processes on the consumer side,
see, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law
Process, 78 MINN. L. REV. 38 (1993); see also Gail Hillebrand, What’s Wrong with
the Uniform Law Process?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (2001) (comparing uniform law
drafting process to public, and especially congressional, legislative process).

38

The famous statement is Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).

39

See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-91
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

40
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hence power and/or money) with different laws. Theories differ,
but one can argue that states compete for valuable migrants by
offering good economies and efficient laws, or for more votes by
seeking migrants who like welfare benefits and/or high taxes, or
for migrants with high human capital by offering a haven from
earlier creditors.41 I will refer to these two ideas as the “laboratory”
and the “marketplace” aspects of federalism.
In addition, horizontal federalism can help achieve a kind of
lawmaking that accommodates the logistical difficulties of a large
and geographically dispersed citizenry. With smaller and more
decentralized governments, the government is closer and more
responsive to the people, and the people have easier access and a
more particular stake in the government. Being closer to the people,
it is presumably more participatory, and the people can become
better educated about what their government is doing.42 “Power to
the people,” goes the slogan. This structure should also alleviate
some collective action problems because the people’s interests are
less diffuse. Similarly, different segments of society have different
problems and would benefit from the possibility of different
solutions. Diverse solutions are more likely under a regime of
federalism. A segmented governmental organization allows a
relatively appropriate and robust response to local problems when
otherwise there would be (a) no response because of the dominance
of those who do not suffer the problem, (b) a weak response
because of a necessary compromise with those who do not suffer
the problem, or (c) an inappropriately strong response, where those
who do not suffer the problem must nevertheless pay the costs of
the solution. Examples include rent and water controls. Some

Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
201 (1996).
41

See Amar, Five Views, at 1234 (although Amar links these attributes to the
scientific laboratory metaphor).

42
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places arguably need them, some places do not—or need controls
of a different kind. Federalism allows diverse laws for diverse
needs.
Although federalism is characterized by these different benefits, a
number of recognized problems beset different aspects of
federalism.43 To put them briefly: Certain kinds of competitions can
create a “market for lemons.” This can happen when consumers do
not have enough information about quality and are therefore
unwilling to pay for higher quality.44 Perhaps because of this
dynamic, citizens—i.e., consumers of laws—may suffer from a race
to the bottom where the small groups who have incentives to
become well informed take advantage of larger groups with larger
but more diffuse interests. Many have argued that this situation has
occasioned just such a “race to the bottom” in corporate law,
although there is substantial scholarly disagreement.45 In addition,
the horizontal division of power among the states can lead to
spillover effects (most obviously, for example, one state sending its
pollution downwind into another state). In democratic terms, this
problem reflects a lack of representation. In economic terms, it is a

Prominent articles include Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994), Vicki Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998), and with
helpful citations to the literature, Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002).
43

See George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).

44

The seminal articles include William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), Ralph Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977),
and Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). See also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW 14-24 (1993). The debate still rages. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1793 (2006).
45
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problem of externalities. And finally, the multiplicity of lawmakers
can deprive society of the benefits of coordination. A unified
approach to lawmaking may be required to achieve the efficiencies
of uniformity in national and international markets. Along similar
lines, some lawmaking contexts may be situations of natural
monopolies, where regulatory competition may be difficult or
impossible, and in any event, an inferior arrangement to a single
legal regime.
2. THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION OF MOLECULAR FEDERALISM
In many ways, private lawmaking is particularly strong along the
horizontal axis, largely because private lawmaking can be
segmented, and then infinitely and constantly rearranged to meet
particular and changing needs. Private lawmaking is literally
boundless, in that it is not tied to geographical boundaries. And it
is flexible: private lawmaking can adapt to different situations in
different ways. Letters of credit can be governed by rules that are
different both in substance and extent from, say, credit cards
(although the two credit devices are actually quite similar), and
these rules may—and do—come from different combinations of
private actors. A problem does not have to be solved by a particular
political entity; a new private lawmaking entity, or entities, can
arise for each situation that would benefit from rules. These points
are a leading argument for private lawmaking, although they will
also need to be qualified, as will be noted in Part III.
The related “laboratory” and “marketplace” categories show
private lawmaking in perhaps its most flattering light, allowing
practically infinite possibilities for experimentation and countless
potential competitions. In economic terms, there is a tremendous
increase in the “supply” of laws available.46 Examples abound—

46 See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245
(1993). Economists generally seem to agree on the efficiency of permitting choice
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even in some areas that seemed to be under the unbreakable
domination of one group, as with diamond trading. The apparently
impregnable dominance of the extraordinarily homogeneous and
insular ultra-Orthodox Jews has suffered significant inroads by
entirely alternative groups under a different (non-state) regime.47
Other more purely legal competitions may be observed in the
promulgation of competing private or quasi-private international
contract law regimes, such as the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European
Contract Law, both of which would seem to compete with the
publicly made United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, as well as with domestic law. The
existence of these examples shows that at least in some contexts, a
real regulatory competition is possible, and the benefits of that
competition can be realized.48

of law, a point closely related to the dynamics of private lawmaking, although
the view is not shared universally, particularly by those with radical
perspectives. For a recent collection of authorities, see notes 109-110 in Giesela
Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic
Convergence and Economic Efficiency (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=921842.
Barak Richman, How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond
Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 383 (2006) (noting the
importance of the Palanpuri Jain and other Indians in the diamond industry {pp.
40-42 in SSRN version}), is an important complement to Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21
J. LEG. STUD. 115 (1992). See also Barak Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal
Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in LEGAL CERTAINTY
BEYOND THE STATE (Volkmar Gessner ed., forthcoming 2007).
47

See Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, The Making of Transnational Law, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. ___, ___ n.19 (2007) (collecting authorities on
regulatory competition).
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Private lawmaking also breaks what Akhil Amar calls “the seeming
statism of the laboratory perspective”49 and can arguably liberate
lawmaking from the sometimes crippling power of the entrenched
interests who dominate public sector controls.50 This break from
statism and its encrusted interests leads to the separate point,
which I have called “power to the people”: private lawmaking
empowers the people as lawmakers for themselves. This sort of
shift from the state and the creation of a space for private
combinations realizes the possibility seen by the French reformers
who envisioned contract as a lawmaking opportunity for any
individual who could find a contracting partner. The parties can
make the law for themselves in their contract (subject to various
obvious constraints).51
On a larger scale, beyond the basic combination of the two-party
contract, private lawmaking has great potential to realize some of
the benefits of democratic theory, and thus achieve greater
legitimacy. When private lawmaking is the result of the efforts of
the group affected by the rules, it provides a strong example of the
kind of democracy expounded by Dewey and now by the
democratic experimentalists. Not only do the people affected
become better educated about their private government and its
rules, but the private government itself is better placed to learn
how its rules can be improved in light of experience. This structure
thus can provide a better opportunity for what these theorists

49

See Amar, Five Views, at 1245.

See PETER VINCENT-JONES, THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING: REGULATION,
RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY ch. 5 (2006). Whether the trenches can be broken
is questionable, however, as moves toward decentralization are countered by
moves toward centralization. Peter Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting:
Public versus Private Ordering?, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. ___, {4} & nn. 22-23.
50

See C. CIV. art. 1134 (Fr.) (“Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à
ceux qui les ont faites.”).

51
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would call “experiment” and “irritation,” and thus correction.52 In
other words, the private government is an organic part of the
governed body, and it can learn from experience. Similarly,
breaking down the scale of lawmaking from its traditional
embodiment in great governmental institutions allows for more
immediate responsiveness and allows the lawmaking process to
take advantage of the benefits of Ian Macneil’s relational contract
theory. As Peter Vincent-Jones points out, “where the mode of
economic organization is contractual, the capacity for collective
learning among the parties involved in the contracting regime is
likely to be dependent on the quality of relationality in the
constituent regulatory relationships.”53 Interestingly, the European
Commission is seeking to find ways to translate this apparent
benefit of private lawmaking into the public sphere under the
rubric of “reflexive governance,” as explained more fully elsewhere
in this Symposium.54
With respect to the diversity aspect of federalism, private
lawmaking is perhaps at its strongest, given its ability to make
rules for different needs. In a way, this is the identity of private
lawmaking, whether at the simplest level of the two-party contract
or in the wider reaching versions of private lawmaking, where
rules can be—and are—made for particular but wide-ranging
contexts (such as letters of credit, which are a very particular credit

For an introduction to the ideas of the democratic experimentalists, see, for
example, Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). For more recent work, and
particularly for ideas on implementing Dewey’s thought, see William H. Simon,
The Institutional Configuration of Deweyan Democracy (2006).
52

53

See Vincent-Jones, New Public Contracting, at ___ n.54.

See id. (citing EUROPEAN COMM’N, FRAMEWORK 6 INTEGRATED PROJECT:
REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2005-2010)).
54
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device that are economically important across the entire globe).55
The fact and the moral dictates of diversity also provide one of the
crucial arguments for federalism in general and for private
lawmaking in particular. Both of these strategies of organization
can help address the problems, raised by both the left and right, of
grossly inefficient central planning and of the repugnant subjection
of diverse actors to a single recognized pattern in which not
everyone fits.56 Here private lawmaking has a particular advantage
over state-based federalism because private lawmaking is
extraterritorial, or put better, it has a nonspatial dimension. Parties
can opt into a regime regardless of their location.
This extraterritorial aspect of molecular federalism is particularly
important in many arenas, commercial and otherwise. The Internet
is the most prominent current example, and examples of private
lawmaking regimes—primarily seal-type programs—abound.57
More fundamentally, some have claimed that computer code is
itself a kind of private lawmaking too,58 and recent events might be
mustered in support of the idea. Microsoft is now encouraging the
use of code to do a kind of job we typically associate with the law:
consumer protection. The company, based on what it perceives as
market demand, is promoting particular software structures to
protect the privacy of end users.59 Others, outside the virtual world

In addition to Snyder, Private Lawmaking, see Gillian K. Hadfield & Eric Talley,
On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, J. L., ECON., & ORG. at 23 (2006).

55

On the left, see David Campbell, Relational Contract and the Nature of Private
Ordering, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. ___, ___ (2007). The classic statement on
the right is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
56

57

See, e.g., Snyder, Private Lawmaking, at 444.

58

See Teubner, Storrs Lecture, at 5 & n.19. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:

AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).

See Consumer Protection—Privacy—Microsoft Guidelines for Software Makers Aim
to Improve, Standardize User Experience, 75 U.S.L.W. 2244 (Oct. 31, 2006).
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of computers and the Internet, have pointed to a different
extraterritorial approach to private lawmaking. Just as it may be
difficult to mount sufficient political support to provide sufficient
state-based computer privacy protection, it may be difficult because
of geographic dispersal to pass nondiscrimination laws related to
sexual orientation. But a seal program can allow dispersed parties
to opt into an extraterritorial legal regime that prohibits such
discrimination, and that channels the benefits of the
nondiscrimination to those who opt in.60 Finally, extraterritoriality
helps level the field for enterprises of different sizes. With
territorial legal regimes, large enterprises can escape mandatory
rules by leaving the jurisdiction, just as many credit card banks put
credit-card entities in Delaware or South Dakota. If players could
opt into regimes without relocation, barriers to entry would be
lower and competition more robust. Of course, at the same time,
regulation would be more difficult.
One separate, more conjectural idea also bears noting: Private
lawmaking may be nimbler than state-based federalism. Outside
the public government, there are fewer obstacles to making new
laws, and smaller lawmaking entities should be able to undo old
laws more easily than is possible for a public legislature, whose
interests are so much larger. This conjecture would seem strongest
when money is at stake: “Politicians and bureaucrats do not
evaluate and pursue innovations in law in the way that
entrepreneurs do—with the speed, flexibility, resources, and
incentives of the market at their disposal.”61 This intuition is
certainly subject to question, however. For instance, the sovereign
debt market’s standard contract terms, which have been considered

See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO
MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS ch. 4 (2005).
60

Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, REGULATION 40, 41 (Spring
2001).
61
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a private lawmaking regime, provide examples that go in both
directions. To support the intuition, one might point to the
introduction of clauses allowing key financial terms to be changed
with just 75% (instead of unanimous) consent. This innovation
solved an important holdout problem that public lawmakers had
seemed incapable of addressing. On the other hand, when a new
standard rule became necessary because of an interpretive shock,
no new rule was introduced, leading some to argue that change in
privately made standard terms seems to happen “rarely, slowly
and quietly.”62
3. EXTENDING THE HORIZON OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: THE
INTERNATIONAL ELEMENT

Although federalism in the United States contemplates a largely
closed system of governance, private lawmaking is not so limited.63
Thus, U.S. constitutional federalism fails to capture the
international, and nongovernmental, dynamics of private
lawmaking. In other words, it does not deal with the possibility of
heterarchy (i.e., rule by another).
Some of the dynamics in the international sphere are similar to
those in the domestic sphere. In both spheres, parties can choose,
whether from familiar choices within the confines of U.S.
federalism or from the wider options available globally. Corporate

See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129
(2006). For the “shock[ing]” litigation, see Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194
F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). For the implementation of the 75% clauses, see Ann
Gelpern & G. Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, ___
WASH. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007), which takes a skeptical view of the
effectiveness of these clauses.
62

To be clear, the reference to a “closed system” is not intended to invoke the
idea of autopoiesis. I leave that argument to others. See, e.g., LUHMANN, supra
note ___, at 467.
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law and securities offerings illustrate the point. Just as a business
whose operations are in Iowa may incorporate in Delaware, and
thus subject itself to the corporate law of Delaware instead of that
of Iowa, a Russian business may offer its financial securities in New
York or London or both, subjecting itself to securities regulation
wherever it chooses.64 For some companies, high legal
requirements may be attractive, and by opting into an exacting
regulatory regime they send signals about value and transparency.
Thus, a foreign company may choose (and many have chosen) to be
listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the rules for
domestic issuers—rules which are more rigorous than those for
foreign issuers.65 From the other side of the ocean, though, the
London financial market is increasing its penetration into the New
York share of the financial markets—largely, it is said, because of
the different regulatory regime.66 This is the stuff of regulatory
competition, whether on the national or the international scale. An
offering in London (or elsewhere in the E.U.) is hardly a move into
a cowboy’s freewheeling plain; the difference is not that there is no
regulation, but that the regulatory structure is different. Notably,
all of these examples include both public and private lawmaking
competitions; the rules come both from the public governments
and from the private exchanges.
Some of the dynamics in private lawmaking are different from
familiar U.S. federalism, however, especially because of the

Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).

64

Edward B. Rock, Coming to America?: Venture Capital, Corporate Identity and U.S.
Securities Law, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 476 (Curtis Milhaupt
ed., 2003).
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Heather Timmons, New York Isn’t the World’s Undisputed Financial Capital, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at C3 (citing a “fear of the United States: of litigation, of
Sarbanes-Oxley, of the reach of the S.E.C., of the disclosure requirements and
penalties associated with false disclosure”).
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possibility of opting for “offshore” havens, where there may be
little or no regulation. To be sure, location offshore sends its own
signals about value and transparency. The crucial point here is that
private lawmaking offers virtually infinite options for legal
regimes, including those with different rules, and those with no
relevant rules, and perhaps no real government at all. In this way,
private lawmaking is not tethered to government as federalism is in
the United States. Obviously this fact could be dangerous or
liberating or both, depending on context and on ideology. On the
other hand, the mere possibility of private lawmaking does not
mean that anything goes. To the extent that actors want to operate
in ordinary (non-offshore) jurisdictions, state-based rules of private
international law can control the choice of law.67
Internet gambling provides a nice case in point. During earlier
empirical research, a leading credit card bank said that the Visa and
MasterCard associations were considering barring the use of their
cards for Internet gambling, largely because of concerns about
business risk.68 These rules either did not come to fruition or did
not last. This lack of private regulation led to a vertical
intervention: Congress passed legislation to force the credit card
banks to prevent use of their products for Internet gambling.69
(Ironically, this move highlights the governmental view that
private lawmaking, had it been implemented, would have been
relatively effective.) Yet there can be little doubt that there will be

See, e.g., Gran Canaria Timeshare Cases, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [German
Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 19, 1997, RECHTSPERUNG ZUM INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHT [IPRSPR.] 1997, no.34.
67

68

See Snyder, Private Lawmaking, at 400 & n.114.

H.R. 4411 was incorporated into H.R. 4954, which became law when the
President signed it Oct. 13, 2006. See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act, H.R. 4411, 109th Cong. (2005); Security and Accountability for Every Port
Act, Pub. L. No. 347-109, §§ 801-803, 120 Stat. 1884, 1953-62 (2006).
69
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some who opt into other, probably “offshore” payments regimes,
escaping both the U.S. credit cards and the U.S. regulation. These
alternative payment systems will have their own rules. Rigidly
certain rules are typically paramount in these contexts. But these
rules will circumvent publicly made law. To use the Cartesian
analogy for federalism, there will be no vertical check on horizontal
expansion.
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for private lawmaking in the
international realm is the difficulty of instituting or finding a
unifying vertical axis—a constitution to provide a structure within
which private lawmaking can occur and can be regulated.
Currently, much of that structure will have to come from rules of
private international law (e.g., rules on choice of law and
enforcement of judgments). These rules can put important,
practical limits on the ability of parties to import laws privately
made offshore into jurisdictions that may matter more, even to the
parties themselves. Whether the rules of private international law
provide a sufficient system of checks or balances, however, is a
large and complex question that is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Nevertheless, it should be observed that some rules of
structure—to enable and to check private lawmaking—will
probably be necessary. These have sometimes been called “metarules” and point to the necessary cooperation of the state (i.e.,
public lawmakers) to effectuate healthy private lawmaking
regimes.70 These meta-rules are similar to the idea of “procedural
regulation” that I have suggested above.

Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Role of Contracts and Networks in Public Governance, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. ___, ___ (2007).
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IV. THE PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM, TRANSPOSED
ONTO THE MOLECULAR LEVEL
Possibly the greatest challenge for federalism, and any plural
lawmaking regime, is the need for coordination or uniformity or
both across a reasonably broad spectrum of commercial
transactions. Evidence shows that the problem is not
insurmountable, but it is formidable. The seeming strength of
choice and competition that may be observed on the horizontal axis
of federalism, which allows parties to choose from competing
lawmaking entities, can lead to a bewildering confusion. That one
entity can deal with issues of electronic letters of credit, while
others can try to move bills of lading (usually with a profit motive
pushing the enterprise) into the electronic world is not an
unmitigated benefit. Coordination can be crucial. To continue the
example, since commercial letters of credit often require a bill of
lading, the lawmaking efforts with respect to both need to take
account of each other, and concerted effort may be required.
In fact, the need for commercial certainty and uniformity was the
impetus for the current Constitution, which replaced the
unsuccessful Articles of Confederation. As Daniel Webster put it,
“Whatever we may think of it now, the Constitution has its
immediate origin in the conviction of the necessity for this
uniformity, or identity, in commercial regulations.”71 The national
power—including diversity jurisdiction—provided for in the
Constitution and the early implementing statutes was adopted
largely to protect creditors’ claims, financial markets, and private
property. The timing of the constitutional drafting is worth
remembering: the Framers worked from May to September 1787,
just a few months after the continual armed attacks on courts to
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As quoted in Issacharoff & Sharkey, Backdoor, at 47 (giving further references).
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prevent foreclosures and other debt processes (generally known as
Shays’ Rebellion, from August 1786 to February 1787).72
Under the Constitution, and particularly its provision for federal
diversity jurisdiction,73 the United States attempted to provide
commercial safety and uniformity, backed by national power. The
development of a federal common law of commerce would be
helpful in this unifying effort, many thought, and the Constitution,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, attempted to achieve this
uniformity during the long regime of Swift v. Tyson,74 which
allowed the federal courts to make common law even in diversity
cases (i.e., cases that did not involve any federal law but that were
subject to federal jurisdiction simply because the litigants were
citizens of different states). The experiment proved unsuccessful,
however, as its unexpected result was a multiplication of legal rules
and counter-rules as state and federal courts announced common
law rules along separate and sometimes contradictory lines.75 This
multiplicity was in the end unsustainable, and the Supreme Court
finally ended it in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins in 1938,76 primarily on
grounds of federalism, and more particularly, state powers.
This historical experience suggests a limit on the number or variety
of lawmakers, at least in the commercial realm (and likely even
more generally, as more and more becomes commoditized).77 This

RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 225 (2004), cited in Issacharoff &
Sharkey, Backdoor, at 48.
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U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928).
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See Issacharoff & Sharkey, Backdoor, at 46-55.
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304 U.S. 64 (1938).

For example, see MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF BODY PARTS (2006), and for a recent collection of relevant works, see
77

32

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 03

experience also suggests that at least some markets may require a
small number of dominant lawmakers, or perhaps an exclusive
regime. Plural legal regimes, after all, impose costs. Inconsistent or
simply multiplicitous rules raise costs on enterprises that seek to do
business across several jurisdictions, and such enterprises
necessarily incur added information costs just to determine what
laws apply when and where. Litigation and transaction costs can
increase as more auxiliary disputes arise, both in contract
negotiation and in dispute resolution, over choice of law and
forum. Nor do the rules themselves come free; drafting the rules,
and the concomitant study, thought, and lobbying, cannot be
ignored. Further, greater ranges of choices, and greater possibilities
for remaking or revisiting those legal choices, increase costs
associated with instability. The further important problem of
externalities is also unavoidable and will be discussed shortly.78
These costs have to be taken into account when evaluating private
lawmaking and assessing the benefits, especially along the axis of
horizontal federalism, discussed in the preceding section.
Empirical study so far is inconclusive as to whether the market for
laws will produce an efficient balance of diversity and uniformity.
One hypothesis suggests that uniform regimes will attract
adherents, and achieve greater uniformity, only when uniformity is
efficient (i.e., when the benefits of uniformity outweigh its costs).
Some evidence supports this hypothesis. On the other hand, there
is also evidence that suggests that private, uniform regimes are
overproduced, and that while some wither for lack of adherents,
others gain adherents—presumably because of some kind of

JOAN C. WILLIAMS & MARTHA M. ERTMAN, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES
(2005).

AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE

Most of these costs are explained more fully in Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 13840 (1996).
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irrational faith in uniformity—and produce inefficient uniformity.
After all, pluralism may be better, largely for the very reasons given
above in defense of federalism.79
That molecular federalism lacks the coordination that inheres in
constitutional, governmental federalism nevertheless presents
certain opportunities. Coordination does not come easily, even
when it may be desirable or even efficient, and private lawmaking
efforts can potentially break the statist logjam. Private codifications
may achieve a level of adherence and uniformity that is not
possible when international coordination of governments proves
infeasible. Hence, private or quasi-private efforts at unification can,
if they achieve enough adherents, move toward an arguably
necessary uniformity that has been hampered by state (in)action.
The UCP and perhaps the Incoterms have had immense success
and have achieved startling uniformity, without significant
governmental assistance.80 Grander efforts have so far had less
success, although the story is not over, and supranational
government has itself attempted to harness the power of private
lawmaking through the encouragement of private efforts toward
uniform rules. Examples would include the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European
Contract Law.81 Nevertheless, if a dominant private regime does
emerge, it is subject to challenge on legitimacy grounds, as exit is
not a real possibility. If no dominant regime emerges, then the cost
of multiplicity will remain. This whipsaw effect is a significant flaw
for private lawmaking.

See generally id. For further assessment of the costs of uniformity (and thus the
benefits of pluralism), see id. at 140-41.
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See Snyder, Private Lawmaking, at 389-95.

81 PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Ole Lando & H. Beale eds., 19992002), and UNIDROIT [INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE
LAW], PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004).
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Another problem is that some private lawmaking structures are
likely to lead to problems of externalities. The most likely are those
exemplified by the interbank agreements authorized by UCC
Article 4, discussed above. There is no reason, absent government
regulation, why many such interbank agreements would not seek
to externalize bank costs onto customers who do not consent but
who are nevertheless bound. This dynamic will also obtain in any
situation where private lawmaking is imposed without consent and
without competition. Some rent-seeking can even be found in the
UCP, where money-center banks impose their favored rules on
other banks.82 To the extent that many lawmaking processes only
include some of the affected parties,83 negative externalities are
likely.
Finally, some private lawmaking regimes also seem likely to
produce a market for lemons. To simplify (and perhaps
oversimplify): where consumers are rationally uninformed as to
some terms, because finding out about them is literally not worth
the time, those terms can escape competition, and lemons are a
possible result.84 Producers, whether of cars or of rules, can evade
competition on anything consumers do not care to find out about.
Credit card rules would seem likely to lead to a race to the bottom
for terms other than interest rates and the like, and many would
probably point to the arbitration term as a case in point. Although
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See Snyder, Private Lawmaking, at 393.
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See id. at 432-35.

There is a necessary qualification: in some circumstances, competition may
alter the premise, and consumers may become informed. For instance, if a
competitor discovers that another seller’s term would be unattractive to
consumers, then that competitor may inform consumers, e.g., through
advertising. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
953, 968-70 & nn. 32-33 (2005) (collecting the prominent authorities). On the other
hand, a competitor who discovers such a term may use the same term itself and
profit by not disclosing the information.
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there is likely to be disagreement normatively, again largely on
ideological grounds, one economic point is worth making: in a
market for lemons, one cannot say that consumers are choosing to
pay less money for a lesser (or riskier) product.85 The informational
asymmetry deprives consumers, including consumers of privately
made laws, of any real choice.

V. CONCLUSION
As the United States has shifted from its eighteenth-century origins,
the operation and conception of federalism has changed. This
transformation has inevitably been shaped by the market
revolutions and machinations of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the prescriptions of the New Deal in the 1930s, and the
rights-based outlook inherited from nineteenth-century laissez faire
and later transferred to criminal procedure and human rights.
Instead of concentrating on the division of power between national
and state governments, current polity refocuses on a division of
power between private actors (including large organizations) on
the one hand, and on governments on the other, whether on the
national, subnational, or supranational levels. What the redactors of
the French Civil Code saw as lawmaking power between two
atomistic private parties has evolved in the crucible of national and
international trade into larger combinations for multinational firms
and associations, and more complex, compound molecular
structures that make and enforce their own rules.

Cf., e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (upholding a
forum selection clause, reasoning in part that the lower litigation costs are being
passed along to consumers, and implying that consumers might well choose this
tradeoff to get lower fares). Note also that only some of the savings will be
passed along to consumers, assuming (as is likely the case) that demand is not
completely inflexible.
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This political structure allows real opportunities for private
lawmaking, here envisioned as molecular federalism. Private
lawmaking can realize many of the benefits of federalism, but with
greater depth and breadth. It also has the qualitative advantage of
being extraterritorial. At the same time, molecular federalism
suffers many of the same problems as governmental federalism.
The theoretical assessment of molecular federalism is thus, of
course, mixed. The practical side is too, as should be expected.
Examining individual efforts at private lawmaking shows that once
a sturdy private lawmaking regime surfaces, the spontaneous free
space for competitive lawmaking efforts often disappears or at least
contracts, as seems to be the case with the UCP and letters of credit.
But there are counterexamples too, as in the sovereign debt market,
even if rule changes are slow and careful.
Domestically, the problems of molecular federalism are susceptible
of easier solution, as at least the national government can act as a
public check on private lawmaking and thus balance undue
expansion on the horizontal axis. Because of the transnational and
extraterritorial dimension of private lawmaking, however, some
problems will likely prove intractable. Especially to the extent that
activities are mobile—and particularly if they can move offshore—
private lawmaking regimes can evade the kind of public interest
balance represented by the vertical axis of federalism. This
phenomenon is profoundly troubling in the context of activities like
human commoditization and offshore payments, and it suggests
that some strategy or strategies—whether conceived as
constitution, meta-rules, or something else—must be implemented
to include the public interest as part of an international polity that
includes private lawmaking.
The epigraph from Wechsler is not a bad measure for trying to
assess the necessarily mixed benefits and costs of private
lawmaking and molecular federalism. That society is “far flung,”
and growing outward, seems undeniable. The other questions are
harder. Is society “free,” and more particularly, does molecular
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federalism help make it freer? In a theoretical sense, molecular
federalism helps. Private lawmaking, and the ever-present
potential for new and alternative lawmaking regimes to arise,
allows both organized spaces for ordered relationships and free
spaces for libertarian experimentation. This conception of
federalism helps achieve some of Professor Teubner’s goals. To
paraphrase and generalize his response to Lawrence Lessig,
“Politically, the point would not be…to combat []corporatism, but
to
stabilise
and
institutionally
guarantee
the
spontaneous/organised
difference
as
such.
The
constitution…would distinguish between spontaneous public
sectors…and highly formalised organised sectors.”86 The organized

Teubner, Storrs Lecture, at 23-24. I recognize that the concluding paragraph
may invert some of Professor Teubner’s ideas about the organized and the free
spaces and the location of rights. Nevertheless (and perhaps surprisingly), I
believe that my conception of the dialectical relationship—the communication—
between the two spaces is similar to his. Systems theory posits communications,
see, e.g., LUHMANN, supra note ___, at 467, and erases individuals. This emphasis
is consonant with the metaphor of the molecule, which exists only as a
compound and only because of the bonds between the atoms. Both contracting,
and on a larger scale, lawmaking, require this bond, relation, or communication.
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To some degree, my ideas must depart from the systems theorists’,
however. Some rights, to my mind, are inextricably part of the individual, or at
least a party; I cannot conceive of rights as floating free of individuals or other
parties. In my conception, there are two kinds of rights: those that inhere in
individual actors, which are invariable, and those provided by institutions,
which are variable. Parties who exist within the organized sphere enjoy the
rights provided by organized institutions. If these actors prefer, however, they
can exit the organized sphere and enter the open space, where they still retain
their invariable and inviolate individual rights, including the right to recombine
with others, to form new combinations (and thus institutions), and to return to
the organized space. This movement or communication between the organized
sphere and the free sphere provides an important check on the institutions
already within the organized sphere. In other words, the ability to exit the
organized sphere and recombine with others in the free space (governed only by
“fundamental rights” and the “constitutional law of the market”) allows the
potential for infinite recombinations and thus infinite alternatives to the
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spaces allow a banding together to resist peril and advance welfare,
whether through governmental or private organization. Thus
corporatism, private and public, occurs in this organized space; it is
the realm of the state, the business corporation, the labor union, the
political party, and the club. The preservation of free, unorganized
space allows those who are dissatisfied with current organizations
to exit and to form new combinations, encouraging a growing
diversity and a healthy ferment, a dynamic of experiment and
learning, irritation and response, presentiation and relationshipbuilding.

institutions (whether state, company, or union) that already inhabit the
organized space. Cf. id. at 24.

